A blockchain constitutes a distributed ledger that records transactions across a network of agents. Blockchain's value proposition requires that agents eventually agree on the ledger's contents since payments possess risk otherwise. Restricted blockchains ensure this consensus by appointing a central authority to dictate payment validity. Permissionless blockchains (e.g. Bitcoin, Ethereum), however, admit no central authority and therefore face a non-trivial issue of inducing consensus endogenously. Nakamoto (2008) provided a temporary solution to the problem by invoking an economic mechanism known as Proof-of-Work (PoW). PoW, however, lacks sustainability, so, in recent years, a variety of alternatives have been proposed. This paper studies the most famous such alternative, Proof-of-Stake (PoS). I provide the first formal economic model of PoS and demonstrate that PoS induces consensus in equilibrium. My result arises because I endogenize blockchain coin prices. Propagating disagreement introduces risk and thereby reduces blockchain coin value which implies that stake-holders face an implicit cost from delaying consensus. PoS randomly selects a stake-holder to update the blockchain and provides her an explicit monetary incentive, a "block reward," for her service. In the event of disagreement, block rewards constitute a perverse incentive, but I demonstrate that restricting updating ability to large stake-holders induces an equilibrium in which consensus obtains as soon as possible. I also demonstrate that consensus obtains eventually almost surely in any equilibrium so long as the blockchain employs a modest block reward schedule. My work reveals the economic viability of permissionless blockchains.
Introduction
A blockchain constitutes a distributed ledger that records transactions across a network of agents. Such a communal ledger possesses value only if agents agree on the ledger's content.
Consensus across agents may be achieved by appointing a central authority to dictate payment validity. Such a protocol describes a restricted blockchain. Philippon (2016) argues that "a restricted blockchain could in fact be used by incumbents to deter entry and stifle innovation" thereby "increase[ing] the rents of incumbents" but recognizes that "blockchain technology could improve... efficiency" otherwise. Thus, blockchain's potential to improve financial market efficiency hinges upon the viability of permissionless (a.k.a. unrestricted) blockchains; this paper studies precisely that topic. This figure compares annual energy consumption for Bitcoin and Ethereum with that for various countries. Retrieved from https://digiconomist.net/ ethereum-energy-consumption.
A permissionless blockchain's lack of a central authority renders the attainment of consensus a non-trivial issue. Nakamoto (2008) alleged to resolve that issue by employing an economic mechanism known as Proof-of-Work (PoW). PoW requires agents to compete to update the blockchain. The competition consists of solving a trivial puzzle so that success probabilities depend upon only raw computational power. An agent competes largely through her energy expenditure, and PoW's incentive structure led to an energy consumption explosion. Figure 1 ranks energy consumption by two PoW blockchains, Bitcoin and Ethereum, against that of all countries. The figure shows that Bitcoin and Ethereum collectively consume more energy on an annual basis than all but 69 countries individually. Separately, environmental researchers project that Bitcoin alone may overtake Denmark in energy consumption by 2020.
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In hopes of creating a sustainable permissionless blockchain (i.e. one that does not expend an exorbitant amount of energy), the blockchain community has bandied about several alternatives to PoW. The most frequently discussed alternative is a mechanism known as Proof-of-Stake (PoS). PoS replaces PoW's competition by offering a randomly selected stakeholder the authority to update the blockchain; PoS thus omits any incentive for agents to engage in a computational arms race. Developers, however, remain reluctant to employ PoS because they fear that PoS fails to induce consensus. PoS, like PoW, offers an agent an explicit monetary reward to update the blockchain, but PoS, unlike PoW, imposes no explicit cost upon agents to gain the authority to update the blockchain. Developers assert that an extant disagreement will persist indefinitely within a PoS blockchain because updating the blockchain, even if inconsistently, constitutes a weakly dominant strategy. This assertion is known as the Nothing-at-Stake problem, and it, if true, nullifies the viability of PoS.
2 This paper's first contribution is to provide the first formal economic model of PoS. Within that model, I subvert the Nothing-at-Stake problem thereby revealing PoS's potential viability.
My result requires endogenous pricing. A blockchain possess a native token or coin that facilitates exchange on that blockchain. A stake-holder of a given blockchain is an agent holding some coins of that blockchain. The Nothing-at-Stake problem implicitly assumes that an agent's decision regarding whether to update the blockchain does not impact coin prices.
I demonstrate the invalidity of this assumption. If an agent appends to the blockchain in a way that perpetuates disagreement then she imposes a cost upon all stake-holders because 1 Bitcoin could consume as much electricity as Denmark by 2020 2 I provide further detail regarding the Nothing-at-Stake problem within Section 2.3.
her action undercuts blockchain coins as a medium of exchange and thereby lowers the value of all such coins. PoS grants authority to update the blockchain to only stake-holders; thus, within PoS, an agent imposes a cost upon herself if she updates the blockchain in a manner that persists disagreement.
Invalidity of the Nothing-at-Stake problem need not imply that PoS obtains consensus. This paper, however, takes the next step and demonstrates general conditions under which PoS leads to consensus. That demonstration constitutes this paper's second contribution.
Formally, I show that restricting access to update the blockchain to sufficiently large stakeholders induces an equilibrium in which consensus obtains as soon as possible. This result arises because the cost of updating the blockchain in a manner that persists disagreement increases with an agent's stake. For sufficiently large stake-holders, the cost of persisting disagreement outweighs the benefit from the explicit monetary reward given to agents updating the blockchain.
I also demonstrates that certain blockchain design choices imply that disagreement resolves eventually almost surely within any equilibrium. This result arises because indefinite disagreement nullifies the exchange value of blockchain coins and thus renders those coins worthless. If indefinite disagreement occurs with strictly positive probability then the conditional probability of indefinite disagreement must approach unity as time passes for paths with indefinite disagreement. On such paths, an agent eventually recognizes that her stake value will erode to zero, so she deviates thereby ensuring that such an equilibrium could not obtain.
Related Literature
Computer science contains a large literature that studies consensus. That literature dates back to Lamport, Shostak, and Pease (1982) . More recent papers within that literature, with relevance to permissionless blockchains, include Miller and LaViola (2014) , Chen and Micali (2016) , Pass and Shi (2016) and Kiayias, Russell, David, and Oliynykov (2017) . My paper differs from those works in that those papers rely upon exogenous behavioral assumptions whereas this paper employs the standard economic paradigm of implying agent behavior based on preferences, pay-offs and equilibrium analysis. Some computer science papers such as Eyal and Sirer (2014) and Nayak, Kumar, Miller, and Shi (2015) explicitly consider incentives but do not analyze equilibrium outcomes. Carlsten, Kalodner, Weinberg, and Narayanan (2016) conduct equilibrium analysis but only for PoW.
Finance's blockchain literature is young but growing rapidly. Harvey (2016), Catalini and Gans (2016) and Yermack (2017) provide overviews. Malinova and Park (2017) and examine economic consequences of blockchain technology. Athey, Parashkevov, Sarukkai, and Xia (2016) , Pagnotta and Buraschi (2018) and Sockin and Xiong (2018) analyze bitcoin valuation and pricing. Easley, O'Hara, and Basu (2017) , Huberman, Leshno, and Moallemi (2017) and Cong, He, and Li (2018) examine miner compensation and organization.
Biais, Bisiere, Bouvard, and Casamatta (2017) study consensus within a PoW blockchain.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces blockchain, PoW, PoS and the Nothing-at-Stake problem. Section 3 states the model. Section 4 invalidates the Nothing-at-Stake problem and proves that PoS achieves consensus under general conditions. Section 7 concludes.
Background 2.1 Blockchain
A blockchain is a virtual chain of ordered blocks. Each block contains data and a reference to the previous block.
3 Blocks may contain transactions (or be empty), and any transaction in a block must be valid given the preceding set of blocks. The blockchain receives an update only when a new block is appended to the end of the blockchain. New transactions enter the blockchain only by being included in a block that gets appended to the blockchain.
Transactions on the blockchain are typically denominated in the currency of a native coin. records an entry in which F spends F's only dollar. This second entry points back to the first entry as a manner of validating that F has the wealth to pay SBUX. If F attempts to make a subsequent $1 payment to MCD then the blockchain will not accept that transaction because F cannot validate the transaction with a previous entry within the blockchain. Figure 2 's blockchain provides a unique history.
The blockchain community references a network state in which agents percieve different histories as a blockchain fork. Figure 3 depicts such a fork with the same transactions as Figure 2 but two histories. On the upper branch's history, F paid SBUX $1; on the lower branch's history, F paid MCD $1. Both histories acknowledge that F had only $1 initially, so neither branch will accept the transaction from Block 1 of the other branch. Both MCD and SBUX may worry about accepting F's payment at face value and, if economically sensible, will haircut payments from a given branch on the basis of, among other things, the probability that the given branch eventually becomes accepted as the true history. This point highlights the need for endogenous coin pricing, a topic that this paper discusses in Section 4. 
Proof-of-Work (PoW)
Forks may arise for a variety of reasons, and a fork may appear without intent. 5 Thus, ensuring that entries eventually become part of a blockchain's unique accepted history necessitates having an effective consensus achievement process. To many within the blockchain community, PoW constitutes the only such viable process.
PoW dates back to Dwork and Naor (1992) , Jakobsson and Juels (1999) and Back (2002) .
Later, Nakamoto (2008) popularized the concept to a broader audience by employing it to allegedly achieve consensus within a permissionless blockchain. Nakamoto (2008) 
Proof-of-Stake (PoS)
PoS attempts to solve the energy expenditure problem created by PoW. To do so, PoS replaces PoW's competition by randomly selecting stake-holders to append to the blockchain.
The simplest implementation of PoS involves each blockchain branch selecting uniformly and randomly from the universe of blockchain coins. The owner of the selected coin then receives the option to append to the branch that selected her coin and simultaneously collect a reward.
This protocol succeeds in reducing energy expenditure to negligible levels, but in doing so, PoS threatens to re-establish the problem ostensibly solved by PoW, the Nothing-at-Stake problem. Figure 4 depicts the Nothing-at-Stake problem. One may view the act of appending to a branch of the blockchain as voting for that particular branch. Within that context, Figure 4 6 The interested reader may consult Narayanan, Bonneau, Felten, Miller, and Goldfeder (2016) for a detailed discussion regarding PoW. Nakamoto (2008) also provides a description of the protocol.
7 This description characterizes the Nothing-at-Stake problem. I provide additional detail later in this section.
8 Attempting to solve this puzzle is known as mining, and agents who mine are known as miners. contends that PoS makes consensus impossible to achieve. This argument takes as given that each branch has some probability of becoming the unique history. The argument proceeds by asserting that appending blocks to all branches possible constitutes a weakly dominant strategy because all block rewards have non-negative value and agents obtain the right to append to the blockchain without expense. Figure 4 considers the specific case of a two-branch fork. This setting assumes that Branch A and Branch B possess a 90% and 10% probability of resolving as the true history respectively. Figure 4 evaluates an agent's pay-offs given that the agent receives the option to append a block to both branches. Although Branch A possesses a higher probability of resolving as the true history, the Nothing-at-Stake problem asserts that the agent will append blocks to both branches of the blockchain because this strategy yields a higher pay-off than appending a block to only Branch A. The stated argument exogenously imposes particular probabilities for a given branch to resolve as the true branch and then implicitly assumes that agent behavior does not affect coin prices. This paper takes the view that both coin prices and the aforementioned probabilities constitute endogenous quantities arising from the strategic choices of agents. Based on that view, this paper demonstrates that appending blocks to all branches imposes a cost upon an agent by reducing the value of blockchain coins. I formalize this point in Section 4.1.
Model
This paper primarily analyzes whether PoS achieves consensus. As a lack of consensus exists only if a blockchain fork persists, I model a fork and then evaluate if this fork persists under a PoS protocol. This section details the model.
Environment
I model an extensive form game with periods t P N. The game involves N ě 2 players with N P N and I " t1, ..., N u. Player i holds π i P p0, 1q proportion of coins within the system at t " 0 with
π i " 1. I let S P R``denote the total coin stock at t " 0.
without loss of generality under the interpretation that this model analyzes a PoS protocol that restricts the set of agents with the ability to append to the blockchain. 
PoS Protocol
I assume the blockchain employs a PoS protocol. This assumption implies that all periods t ě 1 begin with each branch leaf node simultaneously and randomly selecting a coin from the set of coins owned by players. Any player who owns a drawn coin receives the option to append a block to the branch that drew her coin. All players receiving an option to extend a branch within any period act simultaneously during that period. Any player who receives that option in period t earns R t P R`in that period if she exercises her option. I assume
No other activity occurs within a period, and the subsequent period commences immediately.
A Fork
I assume that a fork arises at t " 0. No further action occurs at t " 0, and the blocks that cause this fork involve no transactions. Then, this fork consists of two equally long branches at the end of t " 0. 
Action Space

Probability Space
The model's only source of randomness arises from each branch randomly selecting a player at each time step. When the players play σ P A " Ś 
more formal treatment of the model's probability space within Appendix A. This "k-block rule" assumption possesses empirical support. Figure 5 depicts the frequency with which a branch eventually becomes part of the blockchain as the difference between the length of that branch and the length of the other branch. 10 I show results only for k "´6 to k " 6 because the curve exhibits a monotonic relationship, equals 0 at k "´6 and equals 1 at k " 6. This graph highlights that, for the sample period, the main branch of the blockchain has not trailed any other branch by more than 6 blocks so that taking a lead of 6 blocks practically ensures that a branch will become the main branch. within R. Appendix C provides additional detail.
Achieving Consensus
I let l σ b ptq denote the length of branch b at the end of period t when players play σ. I define
ptq so that ∆ σ ptq represents the gap between branches 1 and 2 at the end of period t. Then, τ σ " inftt P N : |∆ σ ptq| ě ku represents the time at which the blockchain achieves consensus. If ∆ σ pτ σ q " k then I reference branch 1 as the winning branch since branch 1 possesses k more blocks than branch 2 at time τ σ . Alternatively, if ∆ σ pτ σ q "´k then I reference branch 2 as the winning branch since branch 2 possesses k more blocks than branch 1 at time τ σ . 11 I invoke this "k-block rule" for the majority of this paper's analysis, but I derive the main results of the paper without this "k-block rule" in Section 6.
Preferences, Pay-Offs and Equilibrium
I specify that all players possess risk-neutral preferences with a discount factor δ P p0, 1q. I assume that each coin earned on the winning branch confers upon the owner one consumption unit once the blockchain achieves consensus and that each coin generated on a losing branch confers no consumption value.
constitutes the path-wise discounted pay-off for Player i when she plays σ i and other players play σ´i " Ś 
Main Results
This section provides the main results of this paper. Section 4.1 discusses pricing and highlights the fallacy within the Nothing-at-Stake problem. Section 4.2 establishes the existence of an equilibrium in which PoS obtains consensus and provides conditions under which all equilibria achieve consensus.
Not Nothing-at-Stake
For each branch b, time t and set of strategies σ, I define P because PoS potentially entitles the purchaser of a coin to additional coins in probability, and I term those additional coins as dividends of the purchased coin. For any economic agent not interested in appending to the blockchain (e.g. merchants), the ex-dividend price equates with the agent's private valuation. Then, the ex-dividend price equals the price. Hereafter, I
reference the ex-dividend price as the price without any qualification.
Proposition 4.1. Pay-Off Equivalence highlights an equivalence between Section 3's model and one that assumes the aforementioned dynamics. This proposition does not imply that these two models provide identical results as the pay-off equivalence involves an abuse of notation with regard to the fact that, for example,
may possesses a different probability law between the two model specifications. The results of Sections 4.2 and 6 apply to both models regardless.
Corollary 4.2 highlights the relationship between the Nothing-at-Stake problem and whether PoS achieves consensus. The Nothing-at-Stake problem concerns prices, but pay-offs depend upon prices. Thus, prior to turning to equilibrium analysis, I use the remainder of this subsection to subvert the Nothing-at-Stake problem. For exposition, I define P
The Nothing-at-Stake problem alleges that players face no cost by deferring consensus.
However, within a PoS protocol, all players with the ability to delay consensus own some coins, and delaying consensus reduces the value of those coins. The argument sketched within Section 2.3 treats coin value as exogenous and thereby arrives at a mistaken conclusion.
I define two particular strategies before formalizing the aforementioned argument. The first strategy, dubbed the Longest Chain Rule (hereafter referenced as the LCR), corresponds to a player appending only to the longest branch whenever feasible with the longest chain being defined as branch 1 whenever both branches possess the same length. The second strategy, dubbed the Nothing-at-Stake strategy (hereafter referenced as the NSS), corresponds to a player appending a block whenever given the option in line with the Nothing-at-Stake problem. Appendix A provides a formal definition for both these strategies. Hereafter, I
let LCR Proposition 4.3. Not Nothing at Stake @i P I, pσ i , σ´iq P A iˆA´i , at any time t ă τ pσ i ,σ´iq :
Proposition 4.3 avers that coin value obtains a maximum if all players follow LCR. This fact obtains because blockchain coins derive value from their ability to serve as a medium of exchange which in turn depends upon consensus obtaining expediently. As the blockchain achieves consensus at the earliest possible time when all players follow LCR, coin prices achieve a maximum in this case. Proposition 4.3 also states that following NSS instead of LCR when all other players follow LCR strictly reduces coin value. This finding undermines the Nothing-at-Stake problem as it establishes that following NSS imposes a cost upon stakeholders. Proposition 4.3 also asserts that all players following NSS causes coin price to achieve a minimum value of zero which further highlights that playing NSS imposes a cost upon players. 
Equilibrium Analysis
This sub-section demonstrates that PoS achieves consensus under general conditions. I show existence of an equilibrium in which PoS achieves consensus as soon as possible. I also show that all equilibria obtain consensus eventually. Neither of these results hold without If a player appends to the blockchain, she receives a block reward. This block reward possesses non-negative value, but appending to the blockchain may defer consensus and thus decrease coin value. A myopic player with no coins always appends to the blockchain when given the option if the block reward takes a strictly positive value. Alternatively, a player with a large stake opts not to append to the blockchain when doing so defers consensus. Thus, an equilibrium in which all players follow the LCR exists if each player holds a sufficient stake. Proposition 4.4 formalizes that assertion. Proposition 4.4 provides guidance to developers regarding designing a viable PoS blockhain. This proposition indicates that developers should restrict players with small stakes from appending to the blockchain. Having stake impels players to behave well. Moreover, the eligibility threshold for stake that ensures the existence of a symmetric LCR equilibrium depends upon the block reward level because a player must weigh her block reward against her pre-existing stake when deciding whether to append to the shorter branch.
Corollary 4.5 highlights a trivial but important insight: a permissionless blockchain need not possess a block reward. This result arises because a player incurs a cost for delaying consensus but receives no off-setting reward for appending to the blockchain's shorter branch.
If a player refuses to append to the blockchain's longer branch when all other players play LCR then she delays consensus and thereby undermines her own wealth. If a player appends to the blockchain's shorter branch when all other players play LCR then she also undermines her own wealth by delaying consensus, but she receives no block reward to counteract her loss. Thus, absent block rewards, an equilibrium in which all players follow LCR obtains without restricting the set of players with access to append to the blockchain. This finding demonstrates the practical significance of this paper's insights. Proposition 4.6 puts forth a simple but instructive result. If consensus never obtains with probability one then coin value equals zero almost surely. Moreover, since the model assumes bounded block rewards, player pay-offs must equal zero almost surely. Then, since playing LCR implies strictly positive pay-offs irrespective of the behavior of other players, no equilibrium possesses a zero probability of achieving consensus. PtConsensus Obtains|No Consensus by tu " 0 so that as consensus fails to obtain at successive arbitrary horizons, a player eventually becomes more prone to perceiving herself as being on an undesirable path and therefore becomes more likely to deviate to LCR. This eventual deviation, however, implies the impossibility of an equilibrium in which consensus never obtains with strictly positive probability.
Proposition 4.7 re-iterates the advantage gained from PoS protocols providing modest block rewards. Block rewards provide perverse incentives for players to postpone consensus.
Stake provides a countervailing incentive, but an overwhelming reward schedule may cause the perverse incentive to dominate. Thus, this result redoubles the need for developers to heed economic guidance when designing PoS protocols.
Endogenous Entry
In this section, I extend the results of Section 4 by allowing free entry. I augment the model of Section 3 by considering a set of arbitrarily many players, N P N and allowing each player to purchase coins immediately before period t " 0. subject to S i ě 0 with S i " π i S denoting the Player i's coin holding at t " 0 and P denoting the coin price immediately prior to t " 0. S i ě 0 denotes a short-selling constraint which aligns with the real-world implementation of major permissionless blockchains. V 
Si " S (iv) @i, tS i u to obtain, but such a result may obtain if developers impose an analog of the "k-blocks rule" when specifying blockchain rules.
Proposition 6.1. Not Nothing at Stake II @i P I, pσ i , σ´iq P A iˆA´i :
Proposition 6.1 affirms that the Not Nothing at Stake result holds under this sub-section's set-up. As in Section 4.2, coin value obtains a maximum if all players follow LCR. Moreover, playing NSS instead of LCR when all other players play LCR strictly decreases coin value.
Both these results arise because LCR ensures consensus achieves immediately whereas NSS delays consensus. These results re-affirm that the Nothing-at-Stake problem fails to obtain within a formal economic model. , then there exists an equilibrium in which each player follows the longest chain rule. In such an equilibrium, the fork resolves at t " 0.
Corollary 6.3. No Block Reward
If @t P N : R t " 0 then there exists an equilibrium in which each player follows the longest chain rule. Proposition 6.2 establishes the existence of an equilibrium in which all players play LCR.
As in Section 4.2, appending to the shorter branch delays consensus and thereby reduces coin value. This coin value reduction is especially costly for players with large stakes. Accordingly, if a PoS protocol permits only sufficiently large stake-holders to append to the blockchain then a symmetric LCR equilibrium arises. As in Section 4.2, if the blockchain possesses no block rewards then the symmetric LCR equilibrium obtains without restricting the set of players with access to append to the blockchain.
Proposition 6.4. Never Consensus
There exists an equilibrium in which each player follows the Nothing-at-Stake strategy. In such an equilibrium, the fork never resolves with probability one. Proposition 6.4 reveals that Propositions 4.6 and 4.7 fail under this sub-section's set up.
This failure reflects the inability of agents to unilaterally impose consensus with strictly positive probability. If a particular player plays NSS then all players receive a pay-off of zero irrespective of the action of any other player. Thus, each player playing NSS constitutes an equilibrium.
Player 2
N SS p0, 0q p0, 0q Table 1 : Heuristic Normal Form with N " 2 Table 1 provides a heuristic normal form representation of the game with N " 2. Although the bottom right box provides the lowest possible pay-offs, this cell nonetheless constitutes an equilibrium. This result arises because all unilateral deviations from the bottom right also produce the lowest possible pay-off.
Proposition 6.4 indicates that a PoS-blockchain requires additional economic structure to ensure that arbitrary equilibria obtain consensus eventually almost surely. Proposition 4.7
suggests that allowing players to unilaterally deviate to induce consensus with strictly positive probability facilitates such a property. Thus, obtaining a result such as Proposition 4.7 may require developers to build a "k-blocks rule" into the blockchain protocol.
Conclusion
This paper provides the first formal economic analysis of PoS. I demonstrate that PoS achieves consensus under general conditions. Therefore, my work highlights that developers may implement a viable permissionless blockchain without prohibitive energy consumption.
My results do not validate arbitrary PoS implementations. Rather, my conclusions emphasize the need for developers to heed economic guidance when designing consensus proto-cols. For PoS, stake constitutes an important attribute. An agent with negligible stake may delay consensus by seeking block rewards. In contrast, an agent with a large stake undermines her own wealth when postponing consensus even if such behavior yields block rewards.
Blockchain developers, therefore, should restrict the set of agents with an ability to append to the blockchain in line with the blockchain's reward schedule. As the block reward schedule becomes more modest, the necessary restriction becomes more lax.
Appendices A Model
A.1 Action Space I characterize period t's observable events by h P h t with @t P N : h t " I 2ˆt 0, 1u 2 . The first two elements reference the owner of the coin drawn in period t whereas the last two elements reference whether or not each branch received a new block in the same period. More formally, @t P N : h t " pi 1 , i 2 , x 1 , x 2 q represents the following proposition: @b P t1, 2u, i P I:
branch b drew Player i's coin in period t^Player i exercised her option ô i b " i^x b " 1.
h sˆI 2 characterizes the observable history prior to any period-t player action.
This specification implies that, when deciding whether to append to the blockchain in period t, a player knows not only the entire structure of the blockchain but also which players received the option to append to each branch in previous periods and which players hold options to append to the blockchain in the current period. Additionally, I characterize Player i's action space as A i " A 1,iˆA2,i with A b,i " tf : H b,i Þ Ñ t0, 1uu and H b,i "
pH 4j`3´H4j`4 q|u Ť t0u u ă ku. Player i taking action pf 1 , f 2 q P A i asserts the proposition @b P t1, 2u : @H P H b,i : Player i appends to branch b given history H if and only if f b pHq " 1.
A.2 Probability Model
I model the game on a triple, pΩ, F, Pq, generated by two independent sequences of i.i.d random variables, tU 1,t u 8 t"1 and tU 2,t u 8 t"1 , with each variable being distributed U r0, 1s. U b,t represents a draw of a coin for branch b in period t. By construction, @σ P A " depend on the strategy set σ P A.
A.3 Strategies
4i`4 q. For Player i, the LCR corresponds to LCR i " pf 1,i , f 2,i q P A i such that @H 1 P H 1,i , H 2 P H 2,i : f 1,i pH 1 q " I ∆ i pH 1 qě0^f2,i pH 2 q " I ∆ i pH 2 qă0 . For Player i, the NSS corresponds to N SS i " pg 1,i , g 2,i q P A i such that @H 1 P H 1,i , H 2 P H 2,i : g 1,i pH 1 q " 1^g 2,i pH 2 q " 1.
A.4 Beyond k
Section 6 maintains the structure of Section 3 except that I redefine H b,i , τ σ b and τ σ . I define 
B Proofs
Proposition 4.1 Pay-Off Equivalence
@b P t1, 2u, t P N, i P I, σ i P A i , σ´i P A´i : 
Proposition 4.4 Immediate Consensus
If min iPI π iˆS ě R δ k p1´δq 2 , then there exists an equilibrium in which each player follows the longest chain rule. In such an equilibrium, the fork resolves at t " k.
Proof.
i denote a random variable that equals the first period that σ i differs from LCR i on the path of play when all other players play LCR. @i P I : @σ i P A i :
i ďk s suffices to prove the desired conclusion.
q " 0uu and Λ i " tω P Ω :
Then,
The second inequality follows from min
i " H then the result follows immediately. Otherwise, let σ 1 i P A i denote a strategy such that Player i follows σ i at t " 1 and then LCR thereafter. Then,
s which completes the proof.
Proposition 4.6 No Never Consensus
Let σ˚" tσi u N i"1 P A denote an equilibrium. Then PtConsensus Never Obtainsu " Ptτ σ˚" 8u ă 1.
Proof.
By contradiction, suppose there exists an equilibrium strategy set, σ˚" tσi u 
Proposition 4.7 Eventual Consensus
Let σ˚" tσi u
@i P I, t P N, I define strategy σ i,t P A i such that Player i follows σi until period t and LCR thereafter. Then, @i P I, t P N : ErV 
Rt
. Thus, @i P I, t P N :
so that taking limits as t Ñ 8 on both sides yields Ptτ σ˚" 8u " 0 as desired. Proof.
Proposition 5.1 (iv) and (iii) ensure Definition 5.1 (ii) and (iii) by Proposition 4.4. Thus , I need only demonstrate that Proposition 5.1 (i) and (ii) ensure Definition 5.1 (ii).
I assume that Players take the total set of active coins, S, as given. Then, Equation 4 becomes a piece-wise linear optimization problem in S i with slope δ k´P for S i ă S and slope , then there exists an equilibrium in which each player follows the longest chain rule. In such an equilibrium, the fork resolves at t " 0.
Proof. @i P I : τ pLCR i ,LCR´iq " 0 so that Lemma B.1 implies @i P I : σ i P A i : V 
Proposition 6.4 Never Consensus
There exists an equilibrium in which each player follows the Nothing-at-Stake strategy. In such an equilibrium, the fork never resolves with probability one.
@i P I : I define N SS´i " Ś jPI:j‰i N SS j . I proceed by showing that @i P I : σ i P A i : τ pσ i ,N SS´iq " 8 almost surely which implies the desired result.
I define Q : I Þ Ñ t1, 2u such that Qpiq " I i‰1`2 I i"1 . Then, @i P I, t P N : @σ i P A i : tτ 
C Data Scraping
Blockchain.info provides details for blocks on the Bitcoin blockchain. To reconstruct forks within the blockchain over a certain period of time, I query blockchain.info at every block height added over that time period. To minimize human error, I make these queries from R using the rvest package. Blockchain.info provides rich data regarding the Bitcoin blockchain, but this paper's purpose requires only a few fields. For a given block, this paper's purpose requires block height, whether that block ended up on the blockchain and the time that the block was appended to a blockchain branch. Figure A .1 provides a screen capture and thereby demonstrates that
Blockchain.info provides all three pieces of information. The designation "Orphaned" within the height field indicates that the associated block did not end up on the blockchain whereas the designation "Main chain" indicates that the associated block ended up on the blockchain.
